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The Cost of Uncertainty: Navigating the Boundary Between Legal
Information and Legal Services in the Access to Justice Sector
JENNIFER BOND, DAVID WISEMAN & EMILY BATES*
Les organismes d’autoréglementation qui encadrent les professionnels du droit au
Canada contrôlent strictement l’offre des services juridiques. Les projets d’accès à la
justice doivent donc toujours tenir compte des activités qui iraient à l’encontre de
certaines restrictions. Il est par ailleurs difficile de respecter ces paramètres
minutieusement car leurs limites ne sont pas claires. En offrant comme exemple un
projet d’aide juridique aux réfugiés, le présent article souligne les défis que pose le
manque de clarté entre « information juridique » et « services juridiques » aux initiatives
d’accès à la justice. Nous concluons que cette incertitude entraîne divers coûts
importants – y compris des dépenses financières, un fardeau en matière de ressources
humaines et des limites inutiles freinant l’innovation dans le développement de
programmes – dans un secteur qui a déjà grandement besoin de solutions créatives et
abordables étant donné la crise persistante d’accès à la justice. Ultimement, le secteur
sous-financé de l’accès à la justice n’est pas le seul à supporter ces coûts; les personnes
défavorisées et l’ensemble de la société le font aussi.
The self-regulatory bodies that oversee legal professionals in Canada maintain strict
control on the delivery of legal services, and access to justice projects must therefore
always be conscious of activities that would violate certain restrictions. Careful
adherence to these parameters is made difficult, however, by the lack of clarity about
where the relevant boundaries are drawn. Using a project that provides legal assistance
for refugees as a case study, this article highlights the challenges that the unclear
distinction between “legal information” and “legal services” creates for access to justice
initiatives. We conclude that the uncertainty can carry a variety of significant costs—
including financial expense, human resource burdens, and unnecessary limits on
program innovation—in a sector where affordable and creative solutions are desperately
needed as a result of a persistent access to justice crisis. Ultimately, it is not merely the
under-resourced access to justice sector that bears these costs, but rather disadvantaged
individuals and society as a whole.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN CANADA’S LEGAL SYSTEM is a matter of significant concern, and an
accumulating number of government-sponsored inquiries,1 reports,2 and academic studies3 have
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See e.g. Leonard T Doust, Foundation for Change: Report of the Public Commission on Legal Aid in British
Columbia, (Vancouver: Public Commission on Legal Aid, 2011), online: <lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/publications/
reports/pcla_report_03_08_11_1_[1].pdf> [perma.cc/C768-BCTY]; The Honourable Coulter A Osborne, Civil
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identified a deficit of access to justice as a critical issue requiring urgent action. A myriad of
potential measures for moderating this deficit have been proposed,4 and new initiatives are being
developed and undertaken in a climate that encourages experimentation and innovation. The
authors are involved in one such initiative—the University of Ottawa Refugee Assistance Project
(UORAP)—which aims to assist refugee claimants as they prepare evidence for their refugee
status determination hearings. Using our experience with the UORAP as a case study, this article
highlights an issue of serious concern for a broad range of access to justice measures: the unclear
distinction between legal information and legal services. In Canada, the self-regulatory bodies
that oversee legal professionals maintain strict restrictions on the delivery of legal services and
confine the practice of law to a narrow group comprised of professional licensees and other
authorized individuals. Access to justice projects must be conscious of these restrictions in order
to avoid violating unauthorized practice provisions, but the lack of clarity about the relevant
boundaries makes doing so very difficult. Our experiences with the UORAP demonstrate that the
resulting uncertainty can be extremely costly for the access to justice sector, which is already
facing significant resource restrictions.
It is useful to note at the outset the key terminology that frames our discussion.5 In this
paper, we use the term “legal assistance” to broadly describe all forms of activities that assist
with legal problems. This usage is our own, however, and the term “legal assistance” does not
form part of the formal lexicon in this area. We also use two terms of art that are frequently
presented in opposition to each other: “legal information” and “legal services.” While there is no
authoritative definition for “legal information,” “legal services” is defined and tightly regulated
by Ontario’s Law Society Act (LSA).6 More detail about the specific content of these two terms is
provided in Part II below.
Justice Reform Project: Summary of Findings & Recommendations, (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney
General, 2007), online: <attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/cjrp/CJRP-Report_EN.pdf> [perma.cc/
MT73-KP6J].
2
See e.g. Canadian Bar Association, Futures: Transforming the Delivery of Legal Services in Canada, (Ottawa:
Canadian Bar Association, 2014), online: <cbafutures.org/CBA/media/mediafiles/PDF/Reports/Futures-Finaleng.pdf> [perma.cc/JP8T-EE7S]; Canadian Bar Association Access to Justice Committee, Equal Justice: Balancing
the Scales, (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 2013), online: Canadian Bar Association <cba.org/
CBAMediaLibrary/cba_na/images/Equal%20Justice%20-%20Microsite/PDFs/EqualJusticeFinalReport-eng.pdf>
[perma.cc/L6K9-YTS5] [CBA, “Equal Justice”]; Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family
Matters, Access to Civil and Family Justice: A Roadmap for Change, (Toronto: Action Committee on Access to
Justice in Civil and Family Matters, 2013), online: <cfcj-fcjc.org> [perma.cc/R222-C74S] [Action Committee,
“Roadmap for Change”].
3
See e.g. Julie Macfarlane, The National Self-Represented Litigants Project: Identifying and Meeting the Needs of
Self-Represented Litigants, Final Report, (Kingsville, ON: Treasurer’s Advisory Group on Access to Justice, 2013),
online: <lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/For_the_Public/About_the_Law_Society/Convocation_Decisions/2014/
Self-represented_project.pdf> [perma.cc/5CVS-YHF9]; Canadian Forum on Civil Justice, The Cost of Justice:
Weighing the Costs of Fair and Effective Resolution to Legal Problems, online: Canadian Forum on Civil Justice
<cfcj-fcjc.org/sites/default/files/ docs/2012/CURA_background_doc.pdf> [perma.cc/VP2U-A5FU].
4
Examples of some proposed measures are provided in Part I below.
5
These terms are explored in greater detail in Part III below.
6
Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L-8 [Law Society Act]. For the purposes of this paper, our focus is on Ontario since
this was the jurisdiction that was most relevant to the UORAP. It bears noting that the issues we explore have
relevance across Canadian provincial jurisdictions, although the precise terminology and nature of the restrictions
may vary slightly form province to province. For other provincial frameworks, see British Columbia: Legal
Profession Act, SBC 1998, c 9 [BCLPA]; Alberta: Legal Profession Act, RSA 2000, c L-8; Saskatchewan: Legal
Profession Act, 1990, SS 1990-91, c L-10.1; Manitoba: Legal Profession Act, CCSM 2002, c L-107; Quebec: An Act
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This paper proceeds in four main parts. We begin with a brief overview of both Canada’s
access to justice crisis and the current emphasis on using innovative delivery models, like the one
exemplified by the UORAP, to mitigate concerns. In Part II, we explore the dichotomy between
legal information and legal services and the related issue of enforcing prohibitions on
unauthorized practice. In Part III, we explain the application of this distinction to the UORAP,
including how it might have applied in the absence of a special exception uniquely available for
projects in the refugee sector. Finally, in Part IV, we address the costs of the current uncertainty
in this area for already under-resourced access to justice initiatives.

I. CANADA’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE CRISIS AND INNOVATIVE
DELIVERY OF MEANINGFUL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
“Access to justice” is a concept that has long been the subject of academic scholarship7 and that
has now gained a central place in contemporary policy discussions regarding the operation of
Canada’s legal system.8 While the precise content of this term continues to be debated,9 we adopt
an understanding of access to justice that involves three dimensions: a procedural dimension that
is concerned with the ability to invoke and participate in justice processes, a substantive
dimension that considers the ability to attain fair outcomes, and a symbolic dimension that deals
with the respect and recognition accorded by the system as a whole.10 Further, we understand
this multi-dimensional conception of access to justice as applying not merely to court processes
but also to the entirety of the multi-faceted justice system by which law and legal institutions are
designed and operationalized. Finally, we also understand deficits in access to justice to arise
when aspects of the design and operation of the justice system fail to adequately take into
account differentiating and disadvantaging circumstances and social contexts of particular
individuals or groups, such as low-income, minority-language, gender, sex, racialization,
disability, and so on. Such failures lead people to experiences of substantive or procedural
exclusion from, or marginalization within, the justice system.11
Studies examining access to justice over the last five decades have described many
deficits in its attainment, as well as a corresponding variety of public and private initiatives taken
to remove or mitigate these deficits.12 Even amid ongoing uncertainty about the precise scope
respecting the Barreau du Québec, CQLR c B-1; New Brunswick: Law Society Act, SNB 1996, c 89; Nova Scotia:
Legal Profession Act, SNS 2004, c 28; Newfoundland: Law Society Act, 1999, SNL 1999, c L-9.1; Prince Edward
Island: Legal Profession Act, RSPEI 1988, c L-6.1.
7
See e.g. William Conklin, “Whither Justice? The Common Problematic of Five Models of ‘Access to Justice’”
(2001) 19 Windsor YB Access Just 297; Rebecca Sandefur, “Access to Civil Justice and Race, Class and Gender
Inequality” (2008) 34 Ann Rev Soc 339; Patricia Hughes, “Law Commissions and Access to Justice: What Justice
Should We Be Talking About?” (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall LJ 773.
8
CBA, “Equal Justice,” supra note 2.
9
See e.g. ibid; Roderick A Macdonald, “Access to Justice and Law Reform” (2001) 19 Windsor YB Access Just
317.
10
For an elaboration of these dimensions of access to justice, see Bates, Bond, & Wiseman, “Troubling Signs:
Mapping Access to Justice in Canada’s Refugee System Reform” [forthcoming] [Bates, Bond & Wiseman].
11
Ibid; see also: Ian Morrison & Janet Mosher, “Barriers to Access to Civil Justice for Disadvantaged Groups” in
Ontario Law Reform Commission, Rethinking Civil Justice: Research Studies for the Civil Justice Review Vol 2
(Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1996) 636 [Morrison & Mosher].
12
For an overview of the “waves” in access to justice thinking and action over the past 50 years, see Macdonald,
supra note 9. Macdonald acknowledges that the oft-used concept of “barriers” to justice is problematic in that it may

Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2016

3

Journal of Law and Social Policy, Vol. 25 [2016], Art. 1

and content of the term, a consistent and prevailing theme is the persistence of a “crisis”13 in
access to justice and the need for much more concerted ameliorative action.14 Current
understandings of this crisis frame it as a multi-faceted problem that permeates many aspects of
the justice system. The crisis is frequently linked with limited profile, resources, tools, and
coordination on the part of key stakeholders and decision-makers.15
Limited access to legal representation is seen as a critical element of the access to justice
16
crisis. Despite years of concern, many members of the public remain unable to afford lawyers
for a large range of legal matters, including transactional, benefit-claiming, and dispute
resolution services. Lack of access to legal representation, and the access to justice deficits it can
produce, have long been understood to exist for people living on low-income, and there is now
increasing recognition that this shortfall exists for middle-income individuals as well.17
For the very poor, access to lawyers can sometimes be provided through public legal aid
programs, but the funding for these initiatives has failed to keep pace with need, and the
programs themselves are also frequently described as being in a state of “crisis.”18 Indeed, a lack
of resources for legal aid services has led to extremely low financial eligibility criteria19 and a

presume that a society is ready and willing to recognize a justice claim and that realizing the claim is simply a matter
of removing “barriers.” This belies the possibility of a lack of recognition of the claim as one of justice. For further
discussion see Morrison & Mosher, supra note 11 at 637; Patricia Hughes, “Advancing Access to Justice Through
Generic Solutions: The Risk of Perpetuating Exclusion” (2013) 31:1 Windsor YB Access Just 1. We use the term
“deficits” in access to justice to better reflect the complexities of these issues and the roles of social context and
exclusion. See also Bates, Bond, & Wiseman, supra note 10.
13
Canadian Bar Association, Canada’s Crisis in Access to Justice: Submission to the United Nations Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Ottawa, Canadian Bar Association, 2006), online: <socialrightscura.ca
/documents/CESCR-Submissions/canadianbarassociation.pdf> [perma.cc/ND4K-ELWN] [CBA, Canada’s Crisis].
See also: Action Committee, “Roadmap for Change,” supra note 2, which at 1 states that “[t]here is a serious access
to justice problem in Canada” so “[m]ajor change is needed,” and at 2–4 that “everyday legal problems” are
pervasive, particularly for the poor and vulnerable; CBA, “Equal Justice,” supra note 2 at 6 notes “we … need to
convey the abysmal state of access to justice in Canada today. … We cannot shy away from the dramatic level of
change required.”
14
See e.g. CBA, “Equal Justice,” supra note 2; CBA, Canada’s Crisis, supra note 13; Lorne Sossin, Access to
Administrative Justice and Other Worries (2008) Report prepared for Future of Administrative Justice Symposium,
online: <law.utoronto.ca/documents/conferences/adminjustice08_Sossin.pdf > [perma.cc/AP5N-3SJZ].
15
CBA, “Equal Justice,” supra note 2.
16
See e.g. Michael Barutciski, The Impact of the Lack of Legal Representation in the Canadian Asylum Process
(2012) Report prepared for the UNHCR, online: UNHCR <unhcr.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/RPT-2012-06legal_representation-e.pdf> [perma.cc/A42R-EPJ2]; John Frecker et al, Representation for Immigrants and Refugee
Claimants: Final Study Report (2002) Report prepared for the Department of Justice, online:
<canada.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/other-autre/ir/rr03_la16-rr03_aj16/rr03_la16.pdf> [perma.cc/U73B-JU4M].
17
Michael J Trebilcock et al, Middle Income Access to Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012).
18
Jennifer Bond, “The Cost of Canada’s Legal Aid Crisis: Breaching the Right to State-Funded Counsel within a
Reasonable Time” (2012) 59:1 Crim LQ 28 at 28 [Bond, “Legal Aid Crisis”]. See also: Jennifer Bond, “Failure to
Fund: The Links Between Canada’s Legal Aid Crisis, Rowbotham Applications, & Unconstitutional Delay in the
Provision of State-Funded Counsel,” NJCL [forthcoming].
19
See e.g. Legal Aid Ontario (LAO), Am I eligible for a legal aid certificate?, online: Legal Aid Ontario
<legalaid.on.ca/en/getting/eligibility.asp> [perma.cc/T3CH-RV5Q], which states that a sole individual must have an
income lower than $20,225 to be eligible for duty counsel or summary legal advice and must have an income lower
than $12,135 to qualify for a no-fee legal aid certificate; Legal Aid Alberta, Eligibility, online: Legal Aid Alberta
<legalaid.ab.ca/help/eligibility/Pages/default.aspx> [perma.cc/XT8V-RFPE], which states that an individual’s net
monthly income must be below $1,638 to be eligible for most services.
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narrowing of the range of matters for which services are provided.20 Moreover, it has become
increasingly difficult for lawyers who are willing to provide services under legal aid certificates
to make ends meet, leading to strikes and boycotts, and a general withdrawal of services.21 It is
clear that a critical measure for improving access to justice, particularly for people from
disadvantaged and marginalized socio-economic groups, is a fundamental restructuring of, and
reinvestment in, programs that offer subsidized or state-funded lawyers. In many circumstances,
meaningful access to legal counsel is fundamental and irreplaceable.22
It has, however, also been widely recognized that in the absence of hugely significant
increases in public funding for state-funded legal counsel, it may be necessary to explore more
creative mechanisms for improving access to justice. While the use of such alternative models
risks providing insufficient support and obscuring critical underlying issues relating to resource
shortages, it may also be useful for addressing the fact that the full-service legal retainers lawyers
commonly use are, in some cases, a disproportionate means for obtaining access to justice
because they offer more services (and charge more fees) than are necessary.23 In other
circumstances, a lawyer would be the preferred option but, since unavailable, some help may be
better than none.
The wide range of measures aimed at mitigating access to justice concerns can be loosely
grouped into three categories of services:
i) Accessible legal services: A first category seeks to directly improve the affordability
and proportionality of lawyers’ services by establishing and enhancing measures that
make lawyers more accessible. Examples of initiatives in this category are such lawyercentric measures as collaborative lawyering, unbundling legal services, and extending
duty-counsel services.
ii) Alternative legal services: A second category introduces or enhances access to
regulated non-lawyer legal service providers. Examples of such alternative legal
service providers are paralegals, community legal workers, and immigration
consultants. The nature and scope of legal services provided by professionals in this
category is contained in legislation, bylaws, and other regulations,24 and these
individuals are usually governed by regulatory bodies or professional associations

20

Bond, “Legal Aid Crisis,” supra note 18 at 29–30.
Ibid at 30 notes a boycott of serious legal aid cases by Ontario criminal defence lawyers “with the aim of
publically exposing the system’s state of disrepair” and at 40 notes similar strategies were attempted in Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick, and British Columbia.
22
The general importance of legal counsel is reflected in the constitutional recognition of a right to state-funded
legal representation to ensure trial fairness, in certain circumstances, under section 7 of the Charter. For an analysis
of that right, focusing on the civil context, see Kate Kehoe and David Wiseman “Reclaiming a Contextualized
Approach to the Right to State-Funded Counsel in Child Protection Cases” (2012) 63 UNBLJ 163; and focusing on
the criminal context, see Jennifer Bond “Failure to Fund: The Link between Canada's Legal Aid Crisis &
Unconstitutional Delay in the Provision of State-Funded Legal Counsel” (2015) 35:1 NJCL 1.
23
It should also be noted that some strains of access to justice scholarship call for a more general decentring of
lawyers in favour of enhancing the legal empowerment and autonomy of citizens directly. See e.g. Macdonald,
supra note 9.
24
Government of Canada, Backgrounder – Proposing a Regulatory Body to Govern Immigration Consultants,
online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada <cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/backgrounders/2011/2011-0318.asp> [perma.cc/L4Y5-TQ8A].
21
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responsible for setting guidelines and managing complaints and disciplinary
proceedings.25
iii) Legal support services: A third category captures all initiatives that are delivered
outside the scope of legal services regulation, often by people who are not legally
trained. This frequently includes the community services sector, which encompasses a
broad spectrum of governmental and non-governmental service providers. There is a
very wide range of initiatives falling within this category, including self-help guides,
drop-in centres, and web resources.26
While programs and initiatives in all three categories are being actively pursued in response to
the access to justice crisis, there is currently a particular emphasis on expansion and
improvement of legal support services.27 It is this category that captures the most innovative
methods of providing legal assistance and that may offer the best possibility for creative,
affordable, and immediate responses to the deficit of access to justice—particularly given
concerns about ongoing resources constraints. Investment in this area has resulted in a number of
services, resources, and programs aimed at providing meaningful legal assistance without
directly engaging legal service providers. For example, Legal Aid Ontario launched its
LawFacts.ca website in 2011, providing interactive information on criminal and refugee law, and
targeted resources for Aboriginal people and individuals with mental health issues.28 Community
Legal Education Ontario (CLEO) also launched its Your Legal Rights website in 2011, and the
organization now offers regular training to help front-line workers use the website to assist
clients with legal issues.29 Jurisdictions beyond Ontario have been active as well, especially in
British Columbia, with the establishment of a number of Justice Access Centres that are

25

See e.g. The Law Society of Upper Canada, Resources for Paralegals, online: Law Society of Upper Canada
<lsuc.on.ca/for-paralegals/resources-for-paralegals> [perma.cc/9YPS-3MAX]; Canadian Society of Immigration
Consultants (CSIC), “Canadian Migration Institute,” online: CSIC <cmi-icm.ca>.
26
Much of the contemporary discussion of these programs and initiatives is framed around two service models—
those that address “everyday legal problems” (e.g., common civil legal problems in areas such as employment, debt,
consumer protection, family breakdown, and wills and estates), and “early resolution” service models (i.e., seeking
resolution that minimizes the need to engage the formal justice system). There are good reasons to include a concern
for both of these areas, but it is also important not to limit the discussion and initiatives to those concerns. This is
especially so in relation to a lack of access to justice for refugees and other similarly situated people. Refugee
claimants face significant access to justice deficits that require urgent attention, but a refugee claim is not an
everyday legal problem and is not capable of early resolution.
27
For instance, in 2013, the Law Society of Upper Canada’s Treasurer’s Advisory Group on Access to Justice
identified “non-legal organizations [having] a vital role to play” as one of the 12 key themes in Access to Justice
Themes: Quotable Quotes which formed a background paper to a symposium it hosted in that year; see online:
LSUC <lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/For_the_Public/About_the_Law_Society/Convocation_Decisions/2014/
Quotable_quotes.pdf > [perma.cc/KST5-5ZVP]. Likewise, the Triage, Prevention and Referral Working Group of
the Action Committee on Access to Justice recognizes these same organizations as a crucial component of the “early
resolution services sector” in its Final Report: Responding Early, Responding Well: Access to Justice Through the
Early Resolution Services Sector (Toronto: Canadian Forum on Civil Justice, 2013), online: <cfcj-fcjc.org/actioncommittee> [perma.cc/QNG5-R233].
28
Legal Aid Ontario, A Legal Information Resource for Legal Aid Ontario, online: Legal Aid Ontario
<lawfacts.ca>.
29
Fiona MacCool, CLEO Launches New Legal Information Website for Ontario: Your Legal Rights, online: Your
Legal Rights <yourlegalrights.on.ca/news/cleo-launches-new-legal-information-website-ontario-your-legal-rights>
[perma.cc/7GWD-PS9T]; Community Legal Education Ontario, Rights Here Rights Now, online: Your Legal Rights
<yourlegalrights.on.ca> [perma.cc/JZH2-YV3K].
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expressly aimed at everyday legal problems in civil and family matters.30 There are also a
number of NGOs that provide support in many sectors by triaging legal questions, providing
basic support with forms, and helping individuals to identify and self-manage their legal
problems.31
The authors are intimately familiar with the establishment and execution of one project
that seeks to address an access to justice deficit through a legal support services model. In 2010,
Professors Jennifer Bond and David Wiseman (together with two other colleagues)32 founded the
UORAP, a multi-year, national initiative aimed at mitigating access to justice concerns in
Canada’s modified refugee status determination process. Emily Bates serves as the UORAP’s
Director and Community Research Fellow. Our experiences with the UORAP have prompted
this paper, and we will use the project as a case study throughout. Here, we explain both the
access to justice concerns that led to the UORAP’s creation and the ways in which it exemplifies
a legal support services response.

A. UORAP CASE STUDY: A LEGAL SUPPORT SERVICES RESPONSE
TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE CONCERNS IN THE REFUGEE SECTOR
The UORAP was created in direct response to a major access to justice deficit facing refugee
claimants. Canada historically receives an average of 27,000 such claimants each year,33 and it is
trite to note that their personal histories and social context attributes render the vast majority of
these individuals unfamiliar with Canada’s legal system and confronted with many cultural,
linguistic, economic, and other circumstances of difference that pose challenges for their
engagement with the refugee claims process. In addition, these individuals are frequently
suffering from the effects of severe trauma34 and some are detained while their claim for
protection is being processed.35 Most are unable to navigate the refugee system without some
form of legal assistance, and the vast majority are unable to pay for the support they need.
Meanwhile, the interests at stake in the refugee context are significant, and wrongly refused

30

See Ministry of Justice, Justice Access Centres, online: Ministry of Justice <gov.bc.ca/gov/content/justice/aboutbcs-justice-system/legal-help/jac> [perma.cc/Y5LH-8LAL].
31
For instance, the FCJ Refugee Centre, described in Part III, below. See Connecting Ottawa, Interim Activity
Report #4, July 2014, online: Connecting Ottawa <connectingottawa.com/sites/all/files/ACTIVITY%20REPORT
%204_1.pdf> [perma.cc/4R5L-B7Y2] at 12.
32
Our two other collaborators were Adam Dodek, then Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Ottawa and
Peter Showler, then Director of the Refugee Forum and Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of Ottawa.
33
IRB statistics available via the Canadian Council for Refugees (on file with authors). 2013 saw a significant dip in
claims to just over 10,000. While this drop cannot be attributed to any single cause, contributing factors include the
substantial changes to the refugee system and public pronouncements by government expressly deterring certain
refugee source populations from travelling to Canada.
34
See Janet Cleveland & Monica Ruiz-Casares, “Clinical Assessment of Asylum Seekers: Balancing Human Rights
Protection, Patient Well-Being, and Professional Integrity” (2013) 13:7 Ame J Bioethics 13; Janet Cleveland, “The
Guideline on Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the Immigration and Refugee Board
of Canada: A Critical Overview” (2008) 25:2 Refuge 119.
35
From 2004 to 2011, the number of detained refugees per year has ranged from 4,151 to 5,803. For more
information, see Delphine Nakache, “The Human and Financial Cost of Detention of Asylum-Seekers in Canada”
(2011) Study conducted for UNHCR, online: UNHCR <unhcr.ca/beta/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/RPT-2011-12detention_assylum_seekers-e.pdf> [perma.cc/PK5F-N7KG].
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claimants could be returned to face severe persecution, including torture or death. The decisionmaking system is thus imbued with a multitude of critical access to justice considerations.36
The refugee status determination process is the mechanism through which Canada’s
Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) determines whether a particular claimant meets the legal
definition of a “refugee.”37 This is a highly technical decision that involves consideration of both
statutory and jurisprudential frameworks, as well as major findings of credibility.38 The Supreme
Court of Canada (SCC) has recognized that the refugee status determination process carries
extreme significance for individual claimants, particularly since the consequence of a negative
determination can be removal to a country where persecution may occur.39 The Court has also
stipulated that claimants must be given appropriate procedural protections throughout the refugee
status determination process to ensure that constitutionally protected rights to life, liberty, and
security of the person are upheld.40
In 2012, Canada’s refugee status determination process underwent significant reform.41
Changes included, inter alia, new intake forms and processes,42 new first-level decisionmakers,43 a new appeal mechanism,44 and significantly shorter timelines between lodging a claim
and the refugee hearing itself.45 The changes also introduced new refugee claimant “categories,”
with those arriving from certain countries (deemed “safe countries”) or in certain circumstances
(in a group that is “designated” according to a broad discretionary power) facing even shorter
timelines, severely restricted access to appeal mechanisms, increased detention, and a variety of
other punitive measures.46
36

Bates, Bond & Wiseman, supra note 10.
Canada is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which defines a refugee in Art 1. Canada has incorporated
this definition into domestic legislation in section 96 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (in force 22 April 1954), online: United
Nations Humans Rights <ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/StatusOfRefugees.aspx> [perma.cc/T3CNVNTD] at Art 1A(2); Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA].
38
Frequently the most important evidence at a refugee hearing is the claimant’s own testimony. As a result, findings
of credibility are critical to the outcome of many cases. For discussion on the importance of credibility in the refugee
context see e.g. Audrey Macklin, “Truth and Consequences: Credibility Determination in the Refugee Context”
(1998) International Association of Refugee Law Judges Conference Journal 134; Hilary Evans Cameron, “Refugee
Status Determinations and the Limits of Memory” (2010) 22:4 Int’l J Refugee L 469.
39
Singh v Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 SCR 177 at para 22.
40
Ibid at para 36.
41
Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, SC 2012, c 17 [PCISA]; Balanced Refugee Reform Act, SC 2010, c
8 [BRRA]. The PCISA was introduced on 16 February 2012 and received Royal Assent on 28 June 2012. The BRRA
was introduced on 30 March 2010 and received Royal Assent on 29 June 29. For an overview of the reforms,
including the lack of attention to their impact on legal needs and legal aid, see Jennifer Bond and David Wiseman,
“Shortchanging Justice: The Arbitrary Relationship between Refugee System Reform and Federal Legal Aid
Funding” (2014) 91:3 Can Bar Rev 583.
42
Canadian Council for Refugees, Overview of C-31 Refugee Determination Processes (2013), online: Canadian
Council for Refugees <ccrweb.ca/en/refugee-reform> [perma.cc/7LBW-NKM4].
43
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Audit of the Refugee Protection Division Backlog Reduction Initiative
(2012), online: IRB <irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/transp/ReviewEval/Pages/AudVerRpdSprRed2012.aspx> [perma.cc/RP4ZSXLV]; BRRA, supra note 41.
44
PCISA, supra note 41 at clause 59.
45
Amnesty International Canada, “Unbalanced Reforms: Recommendations with Respect to Bill C-31,” Brief to the
House of Commons, online: Amnesty International Canada <amnesty.ca/sites/amnesty/files/2012-0531unbalancedreforms.pdf> [perma.cc/738W-7H3S] at 8.
46
Library of Parliament, Legislative Summary of Bill C-31 (2012), online: Parliament of Canada <lop.parl.gc.ca/
37
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A variety of stakeholders in the refugee system, including legal aid providers, lawyers,
advocates, and community organizations, recognized even before the new laws came into force
that the proposed changes would threaten the ability of refugee claimants to obtain access to
justice.47 The UORAP was founded in an attempt to mitigate some of these concerns. While our
application for funding explicitly recognized “that the preferred solution to many access to
justice issues is legal representation and, in particular, that effective counsel is often critical in
the refugee context,”48 we hoped to at least ameliorate the situation of un- and under-represented
claimants navigating the reformed system through the provision of some form of legal assistance.
Our original project was designed to assist refugee claimants with a proposed disclosure
interview that was subsequently abandoned by legislators prior to being implemented.49 Before
modifying our proposal in response to this change, the UORAP team conducted an
environmental scan to identify both the likely access to justice issues in the new system and what
other organizations were already planning to do to address them. After consulting with over fifty
stakeholders across the country, we determined that several aspects of the new claims process—
including notably, but not exclusively, the accelerated timelines—were likely to create or
exacerbate significant challenges in claimants’ ability to acquire and present evidence that would
be critical to establishing their claim for protection. We ultimately proposed a project that aimed
to assist un- and under-represented claimants with identifying and gathering evidence for their
hearing.
The UORAP secured core funding from the Law Foundation of Ontario’s (LFO) Access
to Justice Fund.50 The project also benefits from partnerships with the Human Rights Research

Content/LOP/LegislativeSummaries/41/1/c31-e.pdf> [perma.cc/N4ND-VFEK] at 2.2 (Designated Foreign
Nationals) and 2.1.3 (Designated Countries of Origin). At the time of writing, the legislative provision barring
access to the Refugee Appeal Division for claimants from Designated Countries of Origin—so-called “safe
countries”—was the subject of ongoing litigation: in July 2015, the Federal Court of Canada ruled the relevant
provision to be unconstitutional and of no force and effect, and certified a question of general importance regarding
its constitutionality. See YZ v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 892. For an overview of the
Designated Foreign National scheme see Jennifer Bond “Failure to Report: The Manifestly Unconstitutional Nature
of the Human Smugglers Act” (2014) 51:2 Osgoode Hall LJ at 377.
47
For examples of critiques and concerns, see e.g. Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, Press Release,
“CARL Responds To New Refugee Legislation, Bill C-31” (16 Feb 2012), online: CARL <carl-acaadr.ca/
articles/45> [perma.cc/AA24-9CLU]; Canadian Council for Refugees, Media Release, “Unfair Policy Fails
Refugees and Canadians: Parliament Hill press conference and demonstration on Bill C-31” (22 March 2012),
online: CCR <ccrweb.ca/en/bulletin/12/03/21> [perma.cc/5JEN-QE6M]; Legal Aid Ontario, Consultation Paper
Meeting the Challenges of Delivering Refugee Legal Aid Services (2012), online: LAO <legalaid.on.ca/en/
publications/downloads/refugee2012/Refugee2012.pdf > [perma.cc/MT8G-PGDU].
48
Refugee Assistance Project, Letter of Intent, unpublished, on file with authors.
49
The original BRRA replaced the former Personal Information Form with a 3–4 hour disclosure interview with an
immigration official within 15 days of the time of claim. At this interview “information about the claim [would] be
collected from the claimant and the IRB official [would] also schedule a hearing of the claim before a public servant
decision maker.” See Immigration and Refugee Board, Notices and Proposed regulations, (2001) 145, online: IRB
<gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2011/2011-07-02/html/reg2-eng.html> [perma.cc/TSG5-C3WH] and BRRA, supra note 41, s
11(2). For further history of legislative reforms, see Bates, Bond & Wiseman, supra note 10.
50
The LFO created the Access to Justice Fund in 2009 after receiving a $14.6 million cy-près award in Cassano v
Toronto-Dominion Bank, (2009) 98 OR (3d) 543(ON SC). The funding application intake to which our project
applied funded access to justice projects in 5 key areas: linguistic and rural access to justice, Aboriginal access to
justice, self-help, family violence, and consumer rights. See The Law Foundation of Ontario, Access to Justice Fund
and Cy-près, online: Law Foundation of Ontario <lawfoundation.on.ca/what-we-do/access-to-justice-fund-cy-pres/>
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and Education Centre,51 CLEO,52 the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa,53 the Canadian
Council for Refugees,54 and Kinbrace,55 as well as from significant contributions from refugee
lawyers, academics, and community workers.
The UORAP includes two programming streams.56 First, we created plain-language
written materials focused on helping claimants get relevant evidence before the IRB. Our
materials consist of a simple “Hearing Preparation Form” (HPF) that uses check boxes and fillin-the-blanks to help identify both the key elements of the claim for refugee protection and the
various pieces of evidence that might be obtained to support each of these elements.57 The HPF
is accompanied by a “To Do List” that allows claimants to develop a plan for acquiring key
pieces of evidence and four plain-language guides that are cross-referenced to various fields on
the HPF.58
Our team recognized that even accessibly written self-help materials may be of limited
use to refugee claimants as a result of a variety of factors (including literacy and language
difference), so our second programming stream was the delivery of full-day training sessions to
front-line community support workers. Our objective was to ensure that those individuals who
were most likely to be in contact with claimants during the pre-hearing period—through
reception houses, social work programs, cultural organizations, women’s groups, et cetera—were
familiar with our materials and able to both provide them to claimants and assist with their use.
A benefit of this approach was that in many cases these community workers would also be able
to assist with bridging cultural and linguistic gaps. Employing a train-the-trainer model, we used
refugee lawyers from across Canada to deliver a custom-designed curriculum that eventually
reached over three hundred community workers from a wide variety of organizations. In the vast
majority of cases, these workers did not have any legal background, meaning that our model fit
squarely within the legal support services category described above.
Since the initial UORAP materials were developed in anticipation of the new refugee
system, the project also contained a monitoring phase such that the actual access to justice
implications of the modified system could be identified and materials revised as needed. Finally,
a modest portion of the budget also supported community outreach and education, a website, and
other administrative activities.
[perma.cc/8XL2-QQ57]; Law Foundation of Ontario (2010), “Access to Justice Fund: Application Form and
Instructions.” On file with authors.
51
The Human Rights Research and Education Centre, of the University of Ottawa, brings together educators,
researchers and students from other disciplines to approach human rights issues from a multidisciplinary and
interdisciplinary perspective, online: HRREC <cdp-hrc.uottawa.ca>.
52
Community Legal Education Ontario provides legal rights education and information to help people understand
how to exercise their legal rights, online: CLEO <cleo.on.ca/en/about/about-cleo> [CLEO Website].
53
University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, online: University of Ottawa <commonlaw.uottawa.ca/en>.
54
The Canadian Council for Refugees is a national non-profit organization committed to the rights and protection of
refugees and other vulnerable migrants in Canada, online: CCR <ccrweb.ca/en/about-ccr>.
55
Kinbrace is committed to a refugee protection system and provides housing, orientation, accompaniment, and
education, online: Kinbrace <kinbrace.ca>.
56
The UORAP also has a monitoring stream and a communications stream. For more detail on the UORAP, see our
website at <uorap.ca>.
57
The HPF was translated into English and French and over 500 copies were distributed. It is also available for
download from the UORAP website.
58
For entire package of documents, see UORAP, Hearing Preparation Kit (2013), online: UORAP <ccrweb.ca/en/
uorap/hearing-preparation-kit> [perma.cc/B43F-M9AW] [UORAP, “Hearing Preparation Kit”].
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The UORAP training program has been widely seen as a success. Surveys of community
support workers reveal that they benefited greatly from our training sessions59 and that our
materials have been integrated into local programs across the country that assist refugee
claimants in a variety of ways.60 Our approach of supplementing basic written materials with
training for community workers has been recognized as a model for those seeking to mitigate
access to justice concerns through the provision of legal assistance to vulnerable groups,61 and
we have secured new funding to expand our monitoring initiatives into a larger academic project
focusing on access to justice and evidence in the new system.62 Overall, the project has
succeeded in supporting the provision of legal assistance through a legal support services
response.
There have of course also been challenges, and this paper explores one of the most
significant: how to ensure that a project specifically designed to assist those without access to
full legal services does not inadvertently violate laws restricting who can provide certain forms
of legal assistance. Specifically, our engagement of non-legally-trained community workers
meant that the UORAP team had to grapple with the distinction between legal information and
legal services. In doing so, we quickly discovered that the line between these concepts is not
always easy to delineate—an issue we discuss in the section that follows.

II. THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN LEGAL INFORMATION
AND LEGAL SERVICES
As mentioned above, strict restrictions on who can provide certain forms of legal assistance
make understanding the terms “legal information” and “legal services” critical for individuals
and organizations engaged in the provision of any form of support for legal problems. While
these two concepts can be clearly distinguished and applied in some circumstances, many
projects are not easily categorized according to this dichotomy—which is simultaneously strictly
applied and poorly defined. These complexities have particular relevance in the context of the
access to justice crisis because of the emphasis on finding innovative ways to provide
meaningful legal assistance to mitigate deficits, often via legal support service models that assist
with the consumption of legal information. However, as this information becomes less static and
general and more dynamic and contextualized—or, in other words, as it becomes more useful to
an individual and more effective as an access to justice resource—it may also begin to take on
59

For example, satisfaction ratings from training participant surveys averaged 9.4/10, indicating that they viewed
the content conveyed in the training as relevant and useful to their work with refugee claimants. Survey summary on
file with authors.
60
Monitoring carried out by the UORAP team in May and June 2014 indicated that organizations across Canada
have incorporated our materials into their service offerings, including using the To Do List as a way to coordinate
and engage claimants with the evidence gathering process, making use of the Hearing Preparation Form to organize
a claim and the evidence needed, and drawing from the Hearing Preparation Kit to answer questions from claimants.
61
For reasons that we identify below regarding the risks associated with navigating the legal information/legal
services distinction outside of the refugee context, we do not feel it is appropriate to name these organizations.
62
Successful grant applications to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council’s Insight Development
Grant program and the joint University of Ottawa and Faculty of Law Research Development Program have
provided $95,000 in additional research funding for this project. The funding will facilitate expansion of our data
pool, which includes full claimant files, and will allow expansion of our research team in order to effectively
analyze this data and produce both academic and community-oriented outputs.
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some characteristics of legal services. The purported distinction between these two terms and the
way the dichotomous relationship between them is monitored and enforced are explained in
further detail immediately below. The implications for the access to justice sector are explored in
Parts III and IV.

A. LEGAL INFORMATION
Legal information is not defined in any Canadian statutes or regulations. This term is often
associated with the related and equally ambiguous concept of “public legal education,” and both
are used to describe a very wide range of services and initiatives.63 Significantly, both are also
frequently defined and delineated specifically with regard to their binary relationship with “legal
services” generally, and “legal advice,” one type of legal service, in particular.64 Indeed, it bears
highlighting that the term “legal advice” is sometimes used as a proxy for the broader term “legal
services,” even though the latter term goes beyond “legal advice” to include a range of other
activities.65
Common descriptions of legal information among access to justice actors show reliance
on this dichotomy. CLEO, for example, contrasts legal information with legal advice in the
following way:




Legal information:
Is general information about the law that is not tailored to an individual’s specific
situation
Can help a person understand when a problem is a legal problem
Can discuss options and possible next steps, indicate when a person needs to get
more help and advice, and how to find that help
…





Legal advice:
Interprets the law and applies legal rules and principles to a particular situation
Is specific to an individual’s particular situation; people’s situations and
circumstances are different even when facing the “same” legal problem
Provides recommendations to a person about their options, based on an assessment of
how the law applies to their specific situation and what the person wants to achieve66

The Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network summarizes the distinction in more simple terms, but
again relies on contrasting definitions: “Legal information can help a client understand the law
and his or her rights, but it is general. Legal advice is about a client’s specific situation. It is
meant to help a client decide what to do.”67 Yet another NGO refers to the distinction explicitly:
63

See e.g. CLEO Website, supra note 52.
Ibid.
65
Law Society Act, supra note 6, s 1(6).
66
Handout at CLEO workshop, “Helping Your Clients Find Good Legal Information,” 17 September 2014, Ottawa.
On file with authors.
67
Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, Counselling in the Context of the Criminalization of HIV Non-Disclosure:
64
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“Legal information is distinguished from legal advice as it is the reiteration of legal fact. Legal
information can be conveyed by a number of means [and] [t]here is no monopoly on who can
provide legal information.”68 The key defining features of these and other operational definitions
contrasting legal information and legal advice are, first, that legal information pertains to facts
rather than analysis and, second, that legal information is general in nature rather than specific to
a particular person or circumstance. There are no regulations that limit who can provide legal
information or in what circumstances it can be made available.

B. LEGAL SERVICES
Unlike legal information, the provision of legal services is tightly regulated. Provincial
legislation outlines the definition and places restrictions on who can provide legal services and in
what circumstances. As noted above, in Ontario—the UORAP’s home province—the LSA
contains the relevant parameters and enforcement mechanisms.69 It is important to note that
similar legislation exists in all other Canadian provinces.70
The LSA specifies that legal services are provided where “the person engages in conduct
that involves the application of legal principles and legal judgment with regard to the
circumstances or objectives of a person.”71 The LSA also enumerates a non-exhaustive list of
examples, including: giving advice with respect to a person’s legal interests; drafting,
completing, or revising a document that affects the person’s legal interests or rights on behalf of
that person; and representing a person before an adjudicative body.72
The LSA (and associated bylaws) also restricts who can provide legal services and in
what circumstances: the right to provide legal services is limited primarily to lawyers with an
active licence to practice law in the province.73 Other persons explicitly permitted to provide
only certain legal services in certain circumstances include licensed paralegals;74 law students
and paralegal students; and a small number of other individuals in very specific and narrow
circumstances.75

Legal Information vs. Legal Advice, online: <aidslaw.ca/site/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Chapter4.1-ENG.pdf>
[perma.cc/QP9Q-TCML].
68
Aaron M Vanin, “Calgary Divorce Procedure & Legal Advice v. Legal Information” (Paper delivered at the
Family Law for Legal Support Staff, Legal Education Society of Alberta, January 2010).
69
Law Society Act, supra note 6.
70
See list of statutes at supra note 6. It should be noted though that in some provinces, such as British Columbia, the
prohibition on unauthorized practice of law only applies in contexts where legal services are delivered in expectation
of a fee or other reward. See BCLPA, supra note 6, s 1(1).
71
Law Society Act, supra note 6, s 1(5).
72
Ibid, s 1(6).
73
Ibid, s 26.1.
74
Law Society Act by-law No 4, Licensing (1 May 2007), online: Law Society of Upper Canada <lsuc.on.ca/work
area/downloadasset.aspx?id=2147485805> [perma.cc/26EM-DBKQ].
75
For example, licensed paralegals may represent a person in small claims court, in the Ontario Court of Justice
under the Provincial Offences Act, on minor summary conviction offenses, and before provincial administrative
tribunals. In the course of this representation, they may give legal advice, draft documents, and negotiate on behalf
of a person. Other than the limited circumstances outlined in the LSA bylaws, they may not provide legal advice
without direct supervision of a lawyer. Law Society of Upper Canada, Paralegal Frequently Asked Questions: Who
Needs a Licence?, online: <lsuc.on.ca/licensingprocessparalegal.aspx?id=2147491230> [perma.cc/E5NH-3AN6].
See also generally ibid.
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C. ENFORCEMENT OF THE DICHOTOMY
The LSA also contains provisions that allow for sanctions to be issued against individuals who
offer legal services without the appropriate authorization.76 These provisions are referred to as
the unauthorized practice provisions. In Ontario, the Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC) is
responsible for investigating, applying, and enforcing the unauthorized practice provisions. The
LSUC is authorized to pursue illegal practitioners in order to prevent further unauthorized
practice,77 and has the power to, for example, issue cease and desist orders, order fines, and
initiate court proceedings.78
Many unauthorized practice prosecutions in Ontario are against former licensees
(disbarred or suspended) who continue to practice, or against non-licensees who advertise or act
as legal “counsel,” legal/law consultants, or lawyers for a fee.79 In 2013, LSUC received 260
complaints for unauthorised provision of services (which represented 5% of all complaints).80
There is no public evidence of any complaints against individuals or organizations offering free
legal assistance, although low-level disciplinary actions such as cease and desist orders are not
made public, and we are aware of at least one such letter sent to an NGO aiming to mitigate
access to justice deficits.81
Below, we demonstrate the challenges associated with applying the legal information
versus legal services dichotomy in the context of innovative programs in the legal support
services sector.

III. APPLICATION OF THE DICHOTOMY TO ACCESS TO
JUSTICE PROJECTS
The implications of the legal information and legal services dichotomy for access to justice
projects are surprisingly under-studied, particularly given recent growth in the legal support
services sector. As discussed above, this category of access to justice responses encourages
creative methods for providing legal assistance and may, for that reason, complicate application
of the traditional dichotomy. There is also a distinct lack of jurisprudence, regulation, and
76

Law Society Act, supra note 6, ss 26.1–26.2.
Law Society of Upper Canada, Taking Action against Illegal Practitioners, online: <lsuc.on.ca/
with.aspx?id=2147486087> [LSUC, Taking Action]. See also Law Society Act, supra note 6 at s 26.3.
78
LSUC, Taking Action, supra note 77. Upon a complaint of unauthorized practice, the Law Society of Upper
Canada may do one or more of the following: “Send a cease and desist letter demanding that the person stop
providing legal services they are not licensed to provide … Conduct an investigation … Ask the person to sign an
undertaking (agreement) to cease the unauthorized activity … Initiate court proceedings … The Law Society can
also prosecute illegal practice in provincial court or provincial offences court.”
79
Ibid, which includes a list of past matters.
80
Law Society of Upper Canada, 2013 Annual Report (Professional Regulation Division), online:
<annualreport.lsuc.on.ca/2013/en/reports/full-report-PRD.pdf> [perma.cc/X8T3-4F2G]. Complaints also encompass
misconduct, mishandling or misappropriation of financial resources, providing services despite conflict of interest,
integrity issues, and client service issues.
81
There is at least one instance in which the Law Society of Upper Canada refused to apply its regulatory powers to
the benefit of a program offering free assistance with legal matters: see Susanne Bouclin, “Regulated Out of
Existence: A Case Study of Ottawa's Ticket Defence Program” (2014) 11 JL & Equality 35.
77
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guidelines exploring the boundaries of legal information and legal services, meaning there is
very little guidance about how to interpret the LSA’s definitions in complex circumstances.
The result is understandable uncertainty about the intersection between innovative access
to justice work and the risks associated with violating the LSA. In this section, we use the
UORAP to demonstrate the challenges associated with ensuring that access to justice projects
remain compliant with the relevant unauthorized practice provisions.

A. UORAP CASE STUDY: CHALLENGES WITH AVOIDING
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
The four University of Ottawa professors who founded the UORAP are lawyers. This means that
from the outset we were more aware of the restrictions on the provision of legal services than
many others working in the access to justice sector are likely to be. We were also ideally
equipped to evaluate these issues and ensure our project was compliant with the relevant laws.
Unfortunately, this proved to be a very difficult task.
1. EARLY ATTEMPTS TO EXERCISE CAUTION
The UORAP team very deliberately considered the application of unauthorized practice laws to
our work. Although the entire purpose of our project was to provide meaningful legal assistance
to vulnerable refugee claimants, we were conscious of the potential of a complaint to the LSUC
if we crossed the line between legal information and legal services.82 We were also aware that
our use of both written materials and community workers who were unauthorized to practice law
meant that our project was particularly susceptible to scrutiny.
With this in mind, we exercised deliberate caution with the language used in our written
materials and training programs. Ultimately, our written materials also included an explicit
disclaimer on each document specifying that our resources were to be used as information only
and that no payment or consideration could be accepted for helping a claimant with the use of
our forms.83 Our training notes also reminded trainers—and instructed them to relay to
community workers—that those using our materials are generally not legal representatives and
cannot replace a lawyer.84 Despite these precautions, the UORAP team became extremely
concerned about the application of unauthorized practice laws to our project after learning that
two employees of the FCJ Refugee Centre (FCJ)—one of the community organizations we were
working with—had received cease and desist letters from the LSUC.
The FCJ is a registered charity that has been a pillar in Canada’s refugee support
community for over 20 years. The centre offers “temporary accommodation to women and
82

Our primary funder, the LFO, was also aware of this potential issue, as were the lawyers we used to assist in
drafting the written materials.
83
The disclaimer on the UORAP’s Hearing Preparation Kit reads: “This Kit and its contents are intended as general
legal information to assist refugee claimants and those assisting them to prepare for their refugee hearing without
compensation.” As will be discussed below, the reference to “no payment” is important in relation to application of
the refugee sector exemption. See UORAP, “Hearing Preparation Kit,” supra note 58.
84
UORAP’s Trainer Notes state at page 4: “NB: This training is not intended to equip community workers to
represent or give legal advice to refugee claimants. … The training may help community workers to understand the
legal issues present in a claim, but it is not intended to assist community workers in representing claimants.” On file
with authors.
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children refugee claimants, workshops on various aspects of the refugee/immigration process,
and information/assistance and referrals to all uprooted people.”85 The FCJ’s co-directors have
been recognized with numerous awards for their work assisting vulnerable people 86 and the
organization is seen as a model in the community. The centre’s website notes that services may
include “assistance with paperwork, translation and interpretation, accompaniment [to hearings],
[and] referral to immigration lawyers.”87 Operating with a volunteer Board of Directors, nine full
and part time staff, and many volunteers, the FCJ has impacted the lives of thousands of refugee
claimants. It is widely seen as an access to justice success story.
In 2012, the LSUC cease and desist letters alleged that FCJ employees were violating
unauthorized practice provisions and ordered them to stop their activities immediately:
The Law Society of Upper Canada … has received information alleging your
involvement in the provision of legal services without a licence.
The allegation is that you are assisting refugee claimants with their legal matters and
that you advertise this service on the website of your organization.
…
A search of Law Society records confirms that a licence has not been issued to you
nor have you applied for a licence. Therefore, you are not authorized to provide legal
services or to advertise the provision of legal services and you must cease and desist
from such activities immediately [emphasis in original].88
Feeling that a significant aspect of the FCJ’s core mandate was in jeopardy, the organization
went into crisis management mode as it prepared its response to the LSUC’s letter.89 The FCJ
soon discovered that the laws surrounding the provision of legal services and legal information
are unclear. After a split opinion among the lawyers on its Board of Directors about the accuracy
of the LSUC’s allegations, the organization sought letters from various legal experts in the field,
including Peter Showler, then Director of the Refugee Forum and former Chair of the IRB. In his
letter in support of the FCJ, Showler emphasized the disastrous effect that closing programs like
theirs would have on the already “desperate” access to justice situation facing refugee claimants,
noting:
[a]t this point, the development of such programs [as the FCJ’s] is choiceless. We
would very much prefer that all claimants were represented by lawyers funded by
legal aid. That option is not available [as a result of a lack of funding]. The only
85

FCJ Refugee Centre, Our Organization, online: <fcjrefugeecentre.org/about-us/our-organization-2/> [perma.cc/
P38U-MM4D]. For a description of the FCJ’s primary services see their website: FCJ Refugee Centre, Programs,
online: <fcjrefugeecentre.org/about-us/programs/> [perma.cc/EW6J-XHPC].
86
For biographies of the co-directors at FCJ see their website: FCJ Refugee Centre, Our Staff, online:
<fcjrefugeecentre.org/about-us/staff/> [perma.cc/6A32-NTZR].
87
FCJ Refugee Centre, About Us, online: <fcjrefugeecentre.org/about-us/> [perma.cc/N6HJ-M56C].
88
Letter from LSUC to FCJ employee (13 December 2012) on file with authors [LSUC-FCJ Correspondence].
89
This section benefited from a telephone interview with Francisco Rico-Martinez, co-director of FCJ (16 July
2014).
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alternative is to give no assistance to unrepresented refugees who have no idea of
how to prove their claim or prevent hasty removal. And that certainly is not
acceptable.90
Showler is also one of the four founders of the UORAP, and he made our team aware of FCJ’s
situation. We became immediately concerned that the LSUC’s letters regarding the FCJ could
have implications for our project as well. Despite the fact that all of our executive members are
lawyers and law professors, we felt the need to seek a formal legal opinion about whether any
aspect of our project contravened unauthorized practice laws—whether in our quest to fill a
major access to justice gap for refugee claimants we had inadvertently crossed the line between
legal information and legal services. Five thousand dollars later we had our answer and ten
thousand dollars later the FCJ had theirs: independent legal opinions sought separately by each
organization confirmed that unauthorized practice laws were not violated by our respective
projects.91 However, as the remainder of this section demonstrates, the reasoning behind these
conclusions was far from reassuring for those of us concerned about the broader access to justice
crisis in this country.
2. EXCEPTIONAL PROTECTION IN THE REFUGEE SECTOR
The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) explicitly allows non-lawyers to represent
or advise refugee claimants as long as there is no fee charged for these services. Section 167(1)
of the IRPA states that a refugee claimant “may, at their own expense, be represented by legal or
other counsel.”92 The term “other counsel” has been interpreted to include family, friends, church
groups, non-governmental organizations, and charitable organizations.93 Significantly,
representatives who do not offer legal services “for consideration” are not subject to the portions
of the IRPA requiring that representatives be (a) in good standing with a law society, (b) students
working under the supervision of an individual in good standing with a law society, or (c) in
good standing with another body that is designated by regulation or is working subject to a
special agreement with the Federal Government.94 The net result of these provisions is that
“other counsel” working for free to represent refugee claimants are specifically allowed by the
federally-enacted IRPA.
As discussed above, the LSA’s unauthorized practice laws appear to be more restrictive.
In particular, they completely prohibit the provision of legal services—broadly defined—by nonlawyers or non-paralegals and do not draw a distinction between services offered for a fee and
services offered for free.
90
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This apparent conflict between the provincial LSA and the federal IRPA is not an isolated
occurrence. In 2001, the SCC considered a conflict between provisions of the federal legislation
that predated the IRPA (the Immigration Act)95 and provisions of British Columbia’s Legal
Profession Act (LPA),96 that province’s version of the LSA. In Law Society of British Columbia v
Mangat,97 the Court held that where such a conflict exists, the paramountcy doctrine provides
that the federal legislation prevails.98 As a result, LPA restrictions on the provision of legal
services by non-lawyer immigration consultants were subordinate to provisions in the
Immigration Act that specifically allowed for such representation to occur.99 There have been a
number of cases since Mangat touching on the paramountcy of federal legislation in the
immigration and refugee context. In each case, Mangat has been applied and the federal
legislation has prevailed.100
The independent legal opinion obtained by the UORAP confirmed our team’s view that
our project was unlikely to be in violation of unauthorized practice provisions as a result of the
protection we received under the IRPA. That statute’s framework for the provision of legal
services to refugee claimants trumps any provincial laws to the contrary. As a result, the
UORAP-trained refugee support workers (and the FCJ, who eventually received similar legal
advice regarding their programs) were able to continue offering legal assistance to refugee
claimants without being concerned about potential unauthorized practice violations.
While this conclusion was extremely helpful for our particular project, the broader
implications of UORAP’s experiences are unsettling. In an environment where creative access to
justice projects are being encouraged across a wide variety of sectors, we are left to wonder what
the legal conclusions would have been if we were facilitating the provision of legal assistance to
un- and under-represented individuals from another vulnerable group—perhaps battered women
seeking to leave their partners, low-income individuals appearing before landlord and tenant
boards to keep their housing, or individuals with disabilities appealing a social assistance
decision. In the absence of federal legislation that specifically contemplates assistance by people
other than legal service providers, projects in these and many other areas appear very susceptible
to scrutiny by law societies on the basis that they may violate unauthorized practice provisions,
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BCLPA, supra note 6.
97
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Consultants v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1435 at para 91.
96

https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp/vol25/iss1/1

18

Bond et al.: The Cost of Uncertainty: Navigating the Boundary Between Legal In

but the results of this scrutiny are unpredictable given the ambiguous dichotomy upon which
they are predicated.
In the section that follows, we explore the potential outcome of such scrutiny to an actual
access to justice initiative by applying the unauthorized practice provisions to the UORAP model
for providing legal assistance. Our goal with this exercise is to demonstrate the challenges that
our project structure faces given the traditional dichotomy between legal information and legal
services. It is important to note that we are able to use our own project to illustrate these issues
precisely because it benefits from the refugee-sector exemption described above: the insulating
effect of the IRPA gives us the ability to publicly expose these uncertainties in a tangible way
without jeopardizing our access to justice work by inviting unauthorized practice-related
scrutiny. Clearly, this candour is not possible for the many legal support services initiatives that
are not protected by explicit federal legislation. For these programs, the issues we identify in our
exemplification below carry real rather than hypothetical consequences.
3. CHALLENGES WITH CHARACTERIZING THE UORAP MODEL AS LEGAL
INFORMATION OR LEGAL SERVICES
It is useful to consider application of the legal information versus legal services dichotomy to
two central aspects of UORAP’s programming activities: the plain-language written materials
themselves and the use of these materials by non-legally trained community workers assisting
refugees to prepare for their hearings.
The potential that UORAP’s written materials could infringe on the territory of legal
services was raised internally during the drafting process. In particular, the UORAP team
discussed the need to avoid having content that appears to be too tailored to a particular claimant
and situation, since this might be perceived as being legal advice. Specific concern surrounded
our frequent use of the term “you,” especially where it was accompanied with somewhat
prescriptive language. An example of a typical passage raising these issues is as follows:
A valid passport is the best document for identification. If you do not have a
passport and cannot get one, try to get the most reliable document available. A
government-issued document is better, preferably one issued by the national
government. Here are some documents that can help you to prove your identity and
nationality:
 Birth certificate,
 National identity card,
 Residence card;
 Certificate of baptism;
 School certificate or diploma
 Driver’s licence […] [emphasis in original].101
As this excerpt from our Hearing Preparation Kit makes clear, the UORAP materials are
specifically designed to provide as much individualized, comprehensible instruction as is
possible using a generic written form. Our ultimate objective was, in fact, to make the materials
101
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feel as personalized as possible for each claimant and we deliberately chose both language and
an adaptable form structure to assist with that objective. These attempts to tailor the materials to
an individual claimant’s needs did, however, mean that our materials may have acquired some of
the characteristics typically associated with legal advice because the claimant was able to use a
series of sequential check boxes and directive language to, in a sense, “receive instructions” that
were directly applicable to his or her specific situation. Nonetheless, the UORAP team ultimately
concluded that these factors were unlikely to convert our written materials from legal
information to legal services.102
The UORAP’s use of non-legally trained community workers to support these written
materials also raised questions about potential conflict with unauthorized practice provisions.
Once again, our choices in this regard were very deliberate and represented a specific effort to
employ an innovative and cost-effective response to an access to justice concern. Recognizing
that a variety of social context factors typical of many refugee claimants (including but not
limited to differences in language and literacy) would make even the best written materials
difficult for a refugee claimant to use alone, the UORAP team developed a custom curriculum
that was delivered to over three hundred non-legally-trained community workers so that they
could understand and use our forms when working with claimants. Our vision was that by
providing these individuals with basic information on the legal elements of a refugee claim, and
guidance on the types of evidence that could be used to prove these elements, we would increase
the capacity of front-line workers to use our written materials to meaningfully assist with
preparation for a refugee hearing. We also aimed to ensure that our training would facilitate
community-worker engagement either as a supplement to legal services provided by counsel or
as a mitigating factor for unrepresented claimants, since it was unknown whether legal aid
services would be able to fund adequate representation in the new system.103
While the UORAP team felt confident in the potential effectiveness of our model, a
concern for us was whether we were facilitating non-legally trained individuals to provide legal
services rather than merely legal information. The UORAP program was deliberately designed to
enable refugee support workers to provide a measure of individualized assistance by narrowing
the focus of the legal information that they would provide according to the specific
circumstances of each claimant. Thus, while the information itself was static, there was selection
involved in its delivery. Further, assistance in developing a list of evidence that might be helpful
for a particular individual was clearly tailored, though not necessarily legal in nature. Ultimately,
our training programs aimed to give non-legally trained workers enough legal information to
help claimants identify what evidence would support their individual claims for protection. This
model creates clear challenges for the traditional dichotomy between legal information and legal
services.
It is important to note that while it is clearly the individualization in the use of UORAP
materials that creates challenges for the distinction between the generality of legal information
and the specificity of legal advice, there is frequently at least some element of individualization
102
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even in the provision of very general legal information, making this factor alone an imperfect
tool for assessing the relevant boundary. It is, for example, common for providers of legal
information to perform some sort of initial triage (using questions on a website or through an
interview with a non-legally trained staff person or through some other mechanism) to
determine, at a minimum, which specific areas of law are likely applicable to a particular person
or set of circumstances. Simply assessing that a person has a problem to which a particular
informational guide may be relevant is presumably not legal advice, even though it does involve
some individualized assessment. Once it is recognized that there is frequently at least some
element of specificity in both legal advice and legal information, the distinction between the two
becomes a matter of degree rather than kind—which makes models like the one employed by the
UORAP very difficult to assess according to a dichotomy which insists on strict boundaries
rather than gradients.
This is not to suggest, of course, that extreme examples are difficult to identify and
analyze. Working with a lawyer to draft a Basis of Claim (BOC) form for a refugee application
is, for example, clearly distinguishable from reading self-help materials that describe the
information required in the BOC. But what if a refugee claimant needs help understanding the
information required in a certain part of the BOC, where in the BOC she should record a
particular fact, or the meaning of challenging BOC terminology in her non-native language?
What if she is not literate and needs help coherently recording her narrative? While drafting legal
documents is generally identified as a legal service that is restricted to lawyers, it is not
necessarily clear whether that extends to assistance with filling out forms and, if it does, what
kinds of “assistance” with these forms are of a sufficient quality and nature that they should be
considered legal services.
A further complexity is the lack of clarity around whether there needs to be a close
relationship between the substance of the assistance and the core components of the legal issue,
or whether all forms of advice that relate in any way to the underlying legal concern may be
deemed legal services. For example, a key component of a refugee claim is establishing risk in
the claimant’s country of origin. While it may be reasonably clear that recommendations relating
to the type of risk that should be emphasized in the claim may constitute legal services, it is less
obvious how to categorize suggestions relating to, for example, particular country events that
may help demonstrate the risk, particular organizations that may provide evidence on the risk, or
even particular websites that may give generally relevant country of origin information. It may
seem intuitive that as the advice becomes increasingly removed from the core issues it loses its
“legal” character, but where this line is drawn is far from clear.
The reality is that it is easier to place access to justice projects like the UORAP on a
spectrum between full-scale individual legal services and completely static legal information
than it is to place them in a binary category. However, since unauthorized practice provisions are
based on enforcing a strict boundary between legal services and legal information, such a
distinction must be delineated despite its opacity.
There is a noticeable deficit of resources to assist with this challenging delineation. Legal
regulators, while anxious to prevent and prohibit the unauthorized practice of law, have not
provided any meaningful public guidance on the critical distinction between legal information
and legal services,104 and the issue has not been meaningfully considered in relevant case law.105
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There is also a surprising lack of scholarship106 or other publicly available resources. As a result,
each individual or organization that provides legal assistance must grapple with the challenging
questions identified above in a relative vacuum of interpretive guidance. In the section that
follows, we discuss the consequences of this lack of clarity for projects aimed at mitigating the
access to justice crisis.

IV. BEARING THE COST OF UNCERTAINTY
Lack of clarity regarding the distinction between legal information and legal services can have
tangible effects on access to justice projects aiming to provide meaningful legal assistance—both
where an actual unauthorized practice complaint is registered and where it is not. It seems selfevident that as the number of projects using a legal support services model increases, so too will
scrutiny by the relevant law societies charged with monitoring and categorizing various forms of
legal assistance. As a result, some of these access to justice initiatives may be the subject of
unauthorized practice complaints on the basis that they are providing legal services without
appropriate authorization. The LSUC’s letters to employees of the FCJ Refugee Centre provide
an example of such an occurrence, and while that specific situation was eventually resolved
through reliance on the refugee sector exception in the IRPA, similar centres operating in other
contexts would be far more vulnerable if a comparable order was issued against them. As
discussed above, the FCJ employees were informed that they must “cease and desist from [their]
activities immediately.”107 This language makes it clear that application of the strict dichotomy
between legal information and legal services in the access to justice sector may ultimately result
in the closing down of certain initiatives.
105

While there are a significant number of cases that involve enforcement of prohibitions on the unauthorized
practise of law, most involve activity that clearly constitutes the provision of legal services, such as drafting
statements of claim or other legal documents, or appearing before adjudicative bodies. As such, these cases
generally do not explore the coherence of the boundary of legal services.
106
A search for Canadian scholarship or other commentary analyzing the coherence of the dichotomy between legal
information and legal services yielded no results. There are some Canadian sources that refer to the role of the
dichotomy in the context of enforcement of prohibitions on the unauthorized practice of law (see e.g. Joan
Brockman, “Money for Nothing, Advice for Free: The Law Society of British Columbia’s Enforcement Actions
Against the Unauthorized Practice of Law” (2010) 29:2 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 1) and in the context of
mapping the availability of assistance for legal issues (see e.g. Mary Stratton, Alberta Legal Services Mapping
Project: An Overview of Findings from the Eleven Judicial Districts (Edmonton: Canadian Forum on Civil Justice,
2011), online: <cfcj-fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/2011/mapping-final-en.pdf> [perma.cc/42HN-5WTS]). A
limited discussion of the ambiguity of the dichotomy exists in Canadian commentary on the dilemma facing
librarians when asked questions about finding and understanding legal reference materials (see Michael E Rice,
“Reference Service versus Unauthorized Legal Practice – Implications for the Canadian Reference Librarian” (1990)
10:1/2 Leg Ref Serv Q 41). A search of American materials yielded few results. There is a similar debate about the
risks faced by legal librarians, including differing views on how to manage those risks (see e.g. Yvette Brown,
“From the Reference Desk to the Jail House: Unauthorized Practice of Law and Librarians” (1994) 13:4 Leg Ref
Serv Q 31; Madison Mosley Jr, “The Authorized Practice of Legal Reference Service” (1995) 87:1 Law Libr J 203).
There is also some discussion of the dichotomy in relation to the scope of assistance that can be provided by
American court clerks (see e.g. John M Greacen, “No Legal Advice from Court Personnel: What Does That Mean?”
(1995) 34:1 Judges Journal 10). The difficulty in defining the dichotomy is addressed in a study of the challenges
posed to the work of advocates for domestic violence survivors (Suzanne J Schmitz, “What’s the Harm? Rethinking
the Role of Domestic Violence Advocates and the Unauthorized Practice of Law” (2004) 10:2 Wm & Mary J
Women & L 295).
107
LSUC-FCJ Correspondence, supra note 88.

https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp/vol25/iss1/1

22

Bond et al.: The Cost of Uncertainty: Navigating the Boundary Between Legal In

Given the severe consequences for non-compliance and the lack of definitional clarity in
this area, it is not surprising that many service providers wishing to protect themselves against
potential unauthorized practice complaints may feel obliged to seek expert guidance to help
resolve the uncertainty. In practice, this means that organizations in already underfunded sectors
must devote precious financial and human resources to figuring out how to properly characterize
their initiatives to ensure compliance with the relevant statutory frameworks. This process can be
incredibly costly. In the case of the FCJ and the UORAP, both organizations devoted many hours
to discussing these issues and thousands of dollars on outside legal research and opinions—
despite the fact that both of these groups operate in the “exempted” refugee sector where a clear
legal conclusion was relatively easy to obtain. Of course, the “easy” resolution in our case was
facilitated precisely by the fact that the underlying questions about legal information and legal
services could simply be avoided. It is reasonable to conclude that in the absence of the refugee
sector exception, the financial and human costs would have been significantly higher for both
organizations because a clear opinion on the status of the actual projects would have been
needed.
It is also clear that additional costs would be incurred in the event that an organization
reached the conclusion (through the assistance of outside counsel or otherwise) that a governing
body alleging violations of the unauthorized practice provisions was wrong in its assessment. In
such circumstances, there would be costs associated with defending the relevant program against
potential disciplinary proceedings, which have the potential to include a full court hearing. Other
issues aside, it is ironic to imagine an under-resourced NGO incurring significant legal expenses
in order to defend a project aimed at making justice more accessible.
In addition to the pure financial and human resources costs of these preventative
activities, navigating this uncertain area risks other potential consequences as well. In the case of
the FCJ Refugee Centre, for example, the LSUC’s letter triggered a major organizational
distraction, ultimately fracturing the Board of Directors and requiring FCJ to call on several
external experts to devote their valuable time to provide letters and legal analysis in support of
the FCJ’s position. While the situation was eventually resolved in favour of the NGO, the
stressful process itself caused the loss of dozens of organizational hours that could have been
spent supporting refugee claimants and, from the perspective of FCJ’s management, resulted in
two Board Members opting not to renew their terms. Further, despite a finding of no wrongdoing
on the part of FCJ and no inappropriate content in its materials or website, LSUC strongly
encouraged alteration of the FCJ website to guard against any future complaints. The
organization has since implemented these recommendations.
The potential chilling effect these types of events may have on other access to justice
projects is also significant, particularly given the lack of clarity and guidance available to
organizations seeking to comply with unauthorized practice provisions. Given the anxiety that
the UORAP team experienced around this issue despite our own legal training and the project’s
position within the insulated refugee sector, it is easy to conclude that other more vulnerable
organizations would feel even more concerned. The result is that service providers in the access
to justice sector are likely to respond to uncertainty on these issues by favouring a very cautious
approach108—a position that has the potential to stifle innovative opportunities for addressing the
108
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access to justice crisis through the provision of meaningful legal assistance in new and creative
ways.
It is significant that each of the costs mentioned above are currently borne by actors in the
access to justice sector themselves, and, further, that these costs are occurring during a time of
prolonged crisis and resource scarcity. These actors are ill equipped to either absorb these costs
or resolve the uncertainty that creates them. Further, the chilling effect discussed above is
particularly troubling given the pervasive need for more creative projects aimed at mitigating
access to justice deficits, not fewer.
In our view, it is incumbent on regulators and lawmakers to assume leadership in this
area and to help provide clarity, as the current ad hoc approach places an unreasonable burden on
those with the least amount of power to offer a systemic response to the current state of
confusion. A comprehensive and considered response is needed because the underlying
objectives of the prohibition on unauthorized practise cannot be recklessly discarded to address
the concerns identified in this article. Indeed, we recognize that a key public policy objective of
the regulatory regime in the legal services industry is to ensure “consumer protection” through
competent provision of services.109 The relationship between consumer protection and access to
justice is, however, double-edged. On the one hand, incompetently provided legal services may
undermine a consumer’s ability to access justice, and ensuring quality provision of legal services
should be regarded as a critical contribution to a fair and accessible system—it does not benefit
the vulnerable to allow incompetence.110 On the other hand, blunt regulation may both limit the
availability of legal assistance and, as we have demonstrated here, create risks for projects aimed
at mitigating access to justice deficits, thus creating or exacerbating the concerns.
It is clear that a balance must be struck and, in the midst of a broader access to justice
crisis that is demanding new and innovative programs, the current approach to defining and
policing the strict, dichotomous boundary between legal services and legal information may be
having a counter-productive impact. Given the complexity and importance of these issues, it is
regulators and lawmakers who are best placed to absorb the costs of conducting a detailed policy
analysis and developing a new, consumer-focused approach across the legal services sector. The
costs of navigating the current uncertainty should not, and cannot, be borne by individual actors
within the under-resourced access to justice sector itself, and the ultimate consequence of a
failure to reimagine these boundaries is yet another obstacle to the delivery of accessible justice
in this country.

online: <representingyourselfcanada.com/2014/03/16/what-court-staff-told-us/> [perma.cc/62VN-689D]. A number
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Canadian scholarship has discussed the chilling effect and negative impact on access to justice of unauthorized
practice prosecutions: see Jula Hughes, “Community-based Access to Justice – Building a Responsive Justice
System in New Brunswick” (2012) 63 UNBLJ 68 and Brockman, supra note 106.
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V. CONCLUSION
A broad array of stakeholders is currently grappling with the urgent need to address Canada’s
ongoing access to justice crisis. As part of efforts to mitigate access to justice deficits in an
under-resourced environment, significant focus is on forms of legal assistance that do not rely
exclusively on legally trained, heavily regulated professionals, and a variety of creative legal
support services are being created as a result. The UORAP is one such initiative and we have
been encouraged by its reported utility for front-line workers who are helping to mitigate access
to justice deficits facing refugee claimants. It is not clear, however, that our model for delivering
legal assistance does not encroach on the boundary between legal information and legal services
in a way that violates unauthorized practice restrictions.
Fortunately, our project was insulated from these concerns as a result of an explicit
exemption contained in the federally-enacted IRPA, so this uncertainty did not prevent us from
continuing our work. Further, our immunity from unauthorized practice concerns has allowed us
to use this paper to share our experiences navigating the complexities associated with the
dichotomy between legal information and legal services. We are conscious of the unique
protection from which our project benefits and are concerned about the impact the lack of clarity
in this area has on important access to justice initiatives operating in other sectors.
The Canadian justice system urgently requires innovative approaches to the provision of
legal assistance. In order to be effective and make efficient use of limited resources, those
crafting and executing important initiatives in this area must have clearly-defined parameters for
their work. The continued threat of unauthorized practice violations creates an atmosphere in
which risk-averse funders and service providers will inevitably resort to more traditional
approaches rather than experiment with the new models that are desperately needed. As a result,
it is not only the under-resourced service providers who bear the cost of this uncertainty—it is
the entire justice system as well.
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